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I INTRODUCTION 
The business judgrnent rule is a reflection of the reluctance of the North 
American judiciary to interfere in corporate decision making. It is now of 
particular interest to the New Zealand lawyer and legal academic, in the 
scramble to predict the extent to which the 1993 Companies Act will bring the 
infrastructure of New Zealand's corporate law closer to its American 
counterpart. 
There is an extensive body of US literature on the business judgment rule, and 
a great deal of critical divergence as to what the content of the rule is, in what 
situations it applies, and whether it is a desirable feature of the law of 
corporations. The rule has been viewed by some commentators as allowing 
management to escape liability for the consequences of their bad decisions 
and encouraging laxity,1 while others consider it to be conducive to necessary 
risk-taking and economic efficiency.2 Still others see the rule as merely 
"meaningless verbiage", arguing that it adds nothing to the pre-existing 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.3 The business judgment rule has been 
defined by the Delaware Supreme Court as 
... a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of 
a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the 
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be 
respected by the courts. The burden is on the party challenging the 
dea:;ion to establish facts rebutting the presumption. 4 
The rule is viewed by the judiciary as providing company directors with a 
necessary safe-harbour from the judgements made by others possessed of the 
benefit of hindsight. The leading cases on the modern business judgment rule 
have been those of the Delaware courts, traditionally regarded as having 
1 
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fostered a jurisprudence indulgent of the interests of rnanagernent.5 The rule 
is not new to US corporate law, and one cornrnentator6 has traced its origin 
back as far as the 1829 case of Percy v Millaudon, wherein it was said that 
the occurrence of difficulties ... which offer only a choice of 
measures, the adoption of a course from which loss ensues cannot 
make the director responsible, if the error was one one into which a 
prudent man might have fallen. The contrary doctrine seems to us 
to suppose the possession, and require the exercise of perfect 
wisdom in fallible beings. No man would undertake to render a 
service to another on such severe conditions. .. The test of 
responsibility, therefore, should be, not the certainty of wisdom in 
others, but the possession of ordinary knowledge; and by showing 
that the error of the [director] is of so gross a kind that a man of 
common sense, and ordinary attention, would not have fallen into 
it.7 
The relationship between the business judgrnent rule and the standard of care 
required of directors is much-debated. In Delaware this case law standard is 
said to be the standard of "the ordinarily careful and prudent person", 
reflecting the objective tort law standard of reasonableness. The courts have 
formulated the business judgment rule to reflect their recognition of the 
inappropriateness of imposing such an objective standard on corporate 
decision makers, so that even if a decision taken by a director was one which 
would not have been made by an ordinarily prudent person, it will be 
protected by the business judgment rule, providing the requirements of 
sufficient information, good faith and honesty are satisfied.8 
The rule has been said to act "as both a procedural guide for litigants and a 
substantive rule of law".9 In its procedural form, the rule has often been 
5 The state of Delaware is regarded as the home of the business judgment rule. The 
minimalist approach of the Delaware courts and state legislature to the regulation of 
corporate behaviour has made it the principal player in the competition among states for 
incorporations. Over 40% 
Delaware. 
of New York Stock Exchange companies are incorporated in 
6 Block, Radin, Barton (eds) The Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Directors (4ed, Weil, Gotshal and Manges, New York, 1993). 
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described as having the effect of a presumption.10 A court will presume that 
defendant directors have made a business judgment based on sufficient 
information, in good faith, and not out of self-interest. There is an onus on the 
party challenging the decision to establish that one or more of these elements 
is lacking. If the plaintiff can do so, then the directors will be denied the 
protection afforded by the rule, and the court may legitimately conduct an 
investigation into the merits of their actions. If the plaintiff is unable to 
discharge this burden, then the "substantive" aspect of the business judgment 
rule will come into play and will preclude the court from superimposing its 
own judgment on that of the directors. 
This paper will give an overview of the way in which the business judgment 
rule operates in American law, and discuss the differing views as to its utility 
and propriety. It will then seek to compare the US position with the 
traditional approach of the commonwealth courts to the issue of when 
shareholders in a company should be able to challenge the decisions of 
management, and conclude as to whether the business judgment rule is 
present (albeit implicitly) in commonwealth law. Finally, the impact of the 
recent companies legislation upon directors' duties and the question of 
whether the new Companies Act introduces a "somewhat scattered business 
judgment rule"11 will be addressed.2 
II THE RATIONALE OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
A The difficulty of assessing corporate decisions 
The difficulty of evaluating business decisions in comparison with decisions 
made in other professional contexts is frequently cited as a justification for the 
rule. It is said that business decisions are "unique, heavily intuitive and 
judgmental",12 and that this renders them less suitable to review in hindsight: 
after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate 
corporate decisions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate 
decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, 
since business imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably 
based on less-than-perfect information. The entrepreneur's function 
is to encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned 
10 see the formulation in Aronson, above, p.1 
11 Hodder, NZ Law Society Seminar Company Law I - Getting Started (1993) . 
12 Gevurtz 308. 
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decision at the time may seem a wild hunch viewed years later 
against a background of perfect knowledge.13 
Therefore, it is said that business decisions are more difficult to assess than the 
decisions routinely made by other professionals, such as medical professionals 
or solicitors, and that "there can be no objective standard by which the 
correctness of every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or 
otherwise .. "14 
In addition to this perceived difficulty, it is often argued that the courts are ill-
equipped and infrequently called-upon to evaluate business decisions.15 In 
American civil law questions of law are decided by the court, and questions of 
fact (including whether certain conduct can be said to be negligent) are left to 
the jury. Whereas a jury of laypeople might be competent to assess whether a 
motor vehicle has been driven negligently, or even whether a building has 
been negligently constructed, it is unlikely that they will be able to judge the 
conduct of a board of directors with comparable ease or accuracy: 
[a] negligent transgression presupposes a departure from normal 
behaviour. The whole concept of negligence and of 'reasonable 
man' presupposes as a predicate a clear conception of what the 
person is doing, and a community understanding of a standard of 
normalcy about how he should do it. Both those pieces are missing in 
the case of the work of corporate directors. 16 
Therefore, the business judgment rule imposes a presumption of good faith, 
disinterest and an honest belief that the action taken was in the company's 
best interests which must be overcome before a jury will be permitted to deal 
with the question of whether a board of directors has acted "negligently". 
B The inefficiency of litigation as a regulator of corporate behaviour 
The business judgrnent rule may also be supported by reference to the 
economic argument that the market is at least as effective a regulator of 
management as the rules for liability of company directors. The interests of 
13 
14 
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shareholders and directors often coincide, as generally, both are concerned to 
maximise the wealth of the corporation. 
Shareholders will invest in corporations in the expectation of making money 
through the increasing market value of their shares, whilst directors must 
manage the company in such a way that it will attract the injection of futher 
capital. Some writers have argued that the company directors' security of 
employment is linked to their competent management of the company, as 
failure to run a company efficiently will lead to a decline in share prices, and 
increase the likelihood of the company becoming the target of a takeover bid. 
Therefore, argue Easterbrook and Fischel, the liability rules are not required to 
operate as an effective deterrent to bad business decisions except in the case of 
"large, one-shot frauds", as "managers' personal gains from negligent conduct 
are small, making the costs they bear without regard to the liability system 
quite sufficient".17 
It has also been suggested that incompetent directors may be removed 
pursuant to a resolution of the shareholders, as powers of appointment and 
dismissal of a board belong to the shareholders. 
C The necessity of corporate risk-taking 
Traditionally, analogies tended to be drawn by courts and writers between 
directors and trustees. Both were termed fiduciaries, and held to owe similar 
duties to the shareholders/beneficiaries whose interests they represented. The 
modern director, however, is commonly recognised as requiring more 
freedom to act than the trustee, as the purposes of companies and trusts are 
quite different. 
The company is essentially a device for maximising the wealth of its owners, 
and in order to profit and expand, it will be necessary for the directors of a 
company to take some risks. Investors in the sharemarket are aware that their 
funds will be less secure if they decide to invest in a company rather than a 
bank, but they freely choose to buy shares, in the expectation that they will 
make more money. Additionally, under the US disclosure rules, a perspective 
shareholder will be in a position to obtain a relatively large amount of 
17 The Economic Stnicture of Corporate Law (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 
1991) 98. 
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information about a company and its management, and will have some 
degree of knowledge about the modus operandi of the directors of the 
company before deciding to purchase some of its shares. 
III THE OPERATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 
IN US JURISDICTIONS 
A. Defining the business judgment rule 
Several commentators have alluded to the problems one encounters in 
attempting to define exactly what the business judgment rule is and the 
nature of its relationship with the duty of care. 
The traditional Delaware version of the rule is that cited above in Aronson v 
Lewis,18 where the rule is phrased as a presumption which the plaintiff must 
overcome before a court will examine the merits of a decision and apply the 
objective standard of care of the reasonably prudent person. In other US 
formulations the business judgrnent rule is simply subsumed into the duty of 
care itself. Section 4.0l(a) of the American Law Institute's Principles of 
Corporate Governance affirms that the standard of care for directors is that of 
the "ordinarily prudent person ... in a like position and under similar 
circumstances", and Section 4.0l(c) which contains the ALI's version of the 
business judgment rule simply provides that "[a] director ... who makes a 
business judgment in good faith fulfils his duty under this section" provided that 
the director: 
(1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgrnent; 
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgrnent 
to the extent the director reasonably believes to be appropriate 
under the circumstances; and 
(3) rationally believes that the business judgrnent is in the best 
interests of the corporation. 
This is a somewhat unorthodox version of the rule. The two principal 
peculiarities are that the rule is not framed as a presumption,19 and that the 
18 
19 
See above, Part I. 
The significance of framing the rule as a presumption is discussed belo, Part Ill,? 
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usual requirement of an honest belief that the action taken is in the company's 
best interests is replaced by a requrement of a rational belief. The latter of these 
has been criticised as allowing a plaintiff more latitude than under the 
traditional formulation of the business judgment rule, as the term "rational" 
imports a degree of objectivity into the test, which is precisely what the courts, 
in developing the rule, sought to avoid. The Official Comment to the draft 
defines "rational" as being more permissive than "reasonable", but not 
precluding judicial inquiry into decisions which are "so removed from the 
realm of reason ... that liability should be incurred".2° Therefore, the drafters of 
the section argue, the "rational basis" requirement is supported by the case 
law which denies the business judgment rule's protection to directors who 
have acted egregiously or irrationally.21 One would imagine that this 
explanation should make the ALI's formulation more palatable to those who 
prefer the more traditional version of the rule, yet critics warn that 
the effect of the 'rational basis' will be to invite plaintiffs to draw 
courts into judicial review of business decisions in order to 
determine whether they had a 'rational basis' - review which the 
business judgment rule was designed to avoid in the first place.22 
Additionally, critics believe that it would be possible for a court to read the 
"rationality" requirement in conjunction with the objective standard of care in 
§4.0l(a) and impose personal liability on directors on the basis of ordinary 
negligence, an outcome which is expressly precluded by the application of the 
Delaware formulation of the business judgment rule. 23 
The uncertain status of the rule is exemplified by its complete omission from 
the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, in favour of leaving the rule to 
case law. One of the framers of the Act commented that 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Revised 
[o]ver the past three years [the American Bar Association's 
Committee on Corporate Laws] has been engaged in an overall 
Comment (d) to § 4.01 of the Principles. 
See below, Part ill?? 
Manning 1497 
The likelihood of such a result is arguably enhanced by the fact that § 8.30 of the 
Model Business Corporation Act restates the standard of care as that which an 
ordinary person would exercise under similar circumastances, and requires a director 
to act in good faith and in a manner she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the 
corporation, but contains no business judgment rule. 
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revamping of the entire Model Act. 1n the course of that exercise, 
the committee tried .. . to grapple with the elements of the business 
judgement rule in new section 8.30. After no less than ten drafts and 
literally hundreds of man-hours of struggle, the effort was ... 
abandoned, and it was decided, faute de mieux, to retain [the old 
language], and seek to go no further. 
In addition to the problems experienced by those who have attempted to 
formulate a statuary model for the duty of care and the business judgment 
rule, the problems of defining the business judgrnent rule is exacerbated by a 
lack of consistency between the various US jurisdictions. Although the 
remainder of this dicussion will generally be based upon the business 
judgrnent rule as expounded by the Delaware courts, it should be pointed out 
that courts in various jurisdictions have developed and applied their own 
particular and disparate versions of the rule. 
An example of the New York courts' approach to the area is provided by the 
case of Kamin v American Express Co.24 This action arose from an allegation by 
a minority shareholder that a certain dividend declared by the directors of the 
American Express Company amounted to waste of a corporate asset. 
The company had owned shares in another corporation ("DLJ") which had 
significantly decreased in value. The board of direcytors declared a dividend 
pursuant to which it distributed its DLJ shares to its own shareholders. The 
plaintiff (a minority shareholder in Amex) contended that the preferable 
course would have been to sell those shares on the stockrnarket. If this course 
had been adopted, the plaintiff alleged, the company would have sustained a 
$25 million capital loss which would have resulted in income tax savings to 
the company of $8 million. The defendant directors sought a pre-trial order 
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, or alternatively, 
for summary judgment. 
The response of the court was that in general terms, directors will only be held 
personally liable for the consequences of their business decisions where the 
plaintiff can point to facts which indicate the existence of some fraud, bad 
dealing, bad faith or oppressive conduct. In this case, none of the above were 
alleged: the plaintiff merely contended that the directors had not chosen the 
24 383 NYS 2d 807 (1976). 
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most beneficial course of action. Such an allegation, the court said, gives rise 
ro no cognizable cause of action: 
the directors' room, rather than the courtroom is the appropriate 
forum for thrashing out purely business questions which will have 
an impact on profits, market prices, competitive situations or tax 
advantages. 
More specifically, the court said that the question of whether or not a 
dividend is to be declared is exclusively a matter of business judgment for the 
board of directors, and will not be interfered with by a court unless the 
plaintiff can show something more than imprudence or mistaken judgment. 
Additionally, the court considered that the directors' decision was not an ill-
considered one. The directors were fully aware of the the fact that a sale 
(rather than a distribution) of the DLJ shares might have led to a tax saving, 
but had decided that the benefits of such a sale were outweighed by the likely 
adverse consequences: the loss of $25 million would have had a severely 
detrimental effect on the net income figures in the Amex financial statement. 
In granting the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state 
a cause of action, the court summarised the situation, saying that 
what we have here ... is that a disagreement exists between two 
minority shareholders and a unanimous Board of Directors as to the 
best way to handle a loss already incurred on an investment. The 
directors are entitled to exercise their honest business judgment on 
the information before them, and to act within their corporate 
powers. 
B The business judgment rule and the duty of care 
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the business judgment rule is its 
relationship with the duty and standard of care. The application of the rule 
will preclude further judicial inquiry into the merits of a business decision 
where the only breach of duty alleged is ordinary negligence on the part of the 
directors. Therefore, judicial and academic references to the standard of the 
"ordinarily prudent person" would seem to be misleading. 
10 
In reality, the situation is fairly clear: the standard of care is intended as a 
standard to which directors are expected to conform,25 but if a director has not 
exercised due care in making a business decision, she will not necessarily be 
held personally liable for any loss which results from her lack of care. Such 
liability will attach only where the breach of duty alleged in proceedings 
against a director is of a kind which will overcome the business judgment 
rule's presumption of good faith, disinterest, honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company, sufficient information and no 
abuse of discretion. 
Where a complaint against directors is based upon a breach of the duty of 
care, and there is no suggestion of a breach of the duty of loyalty, then in 
order to overcome the preswnption in favour of the directors, the plaintiff 
must allege facts which tend to indicate that the defendant directors acted in 
breach of the duty to be informed, or that their actions amounted to an abuse 
of discretion. Both possibilities and their implications for the duty and 
standard of care will be considered below. 
1. Egregious conduct and the substantive bad decision 
Some business judgment rule dicta implies that in the absence of an allegation 
in the pleadings of a breach of the duty of loyalty, a plaintiff will never 
succeed in having the merits of a business decision by the board reviewed by 
a jury.26 This is not the case, as the courts have frequently recognised that 
where a business decision is, on its face, so "egregious or irrational"2 7 or 
exhibits a "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the 
stockholders",28 then the business judgment rule has no application. Such 
conduct will, in fact, be treated as constructive bad faith.29 In Citron v Fairchild 
Camera and Instrument Corp ., the court explained that "there may be instances 
in which an apparently interested board makes a judgment that is essentially 
25 
26 
27 
Block et al 52-53. 
See, for example, Leslie v Lorillard 18 NE 363,365; also Kamin (see above note?????). 
Citron v Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp No 6085 slip op 45 (Del Ch 19 May 1988), 
affirmed 569 A 2d 53 (Del 1989). 
28 Allaun v Consolidated Oil 147 A 257, 261 (Del Ch 1929). 
29 Hansen "The Duty of Care, The Business Judgment Rule, and the American Law 
Institute Corporate Governance Project" (1993) 48 Bus Law 1355, 1365. 
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inexplicable except on the basis of an otherwise unproven inappropriate 
motive ... "30 
Although the concepts of egregious conduct and constructive bad faith have 
been discussed fairly often by courts and writers, there are very few instances 
of judicial application of the notion that directors who have demonstrated a 
blatant and extreme lack of due care will not be afforded the protection of the 
business judgrnent rule. One of the few examples of such a decision is Gimbel 
v The Signal Cos.,31 where a minority shareholder sought an injunction to 
prevent the sale of the corporation's shares in Signal Oil and Gas, its wholly-
owned subsidiary, on the ground that the price of $480 million agreed upon 
was "wholly inadequate". The court considered the circumstances 
surrounding the transaction, and the process by which the directors had 
arrived at the decision to sell at the agreed price. It concluded that the 
procedures followed by the board were not so inadequate that the directors 
could be said "to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised judgment",32 
but that 
... the ultimate question is not one of method but of value. The 
method does not appear so bad on its face as to alter the normal 
legal principles which control. But the hasty method which 
produces a dollar result which appears perhaps to be shocking is 
significant. On the basis of affidavits relating to value, the court has 
the tentative belief that plaintiff would have a reasonable prospect 
of success on the merits since limited record indicates a gross 
disparity between the fair market value of Signal Oil ... and what the 
Board of Directors were willing to sell the company for ... 33 
On that basis, the court decided to grant a preliminary injunction restraining 
the sale, and that a thorough inquiry as to sufficiency of price should be 
undertaken. 
Similar principles will apply in cases of alleged waste of a corporate asset, 
which, as Hansen points out,34 may also be considered under the "egregious 
conduct" exception. Waste will exist where transactions entered into by the 
board of directors are held to have no corporate purpose, or where a company 
30 See above note????citron 43-45. 
31 316 A 2d 599 (Del Ch 1974). 
32 See above note??ibid , 615. 
33 ibid 315. 
34 Hansen 1365. 
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asset is transferred at gross undervalue. In seeking to bring a derivative action 
against a board of directors, a plaintiff shareholder who is unable to state any 
facts which suggest a breach of the duty of loyalty, is likely to phrase its 
complaint in terms of lack of corporate purpose35 or other waste in order to 
avoid the application of the business judgment rule . The courts have made it 
plain, however, that further inquiry into the merits of a business decision on 
the basis of corporate waste will only be sanctioned in extreme circumstances. 
In Aronson v Lewis, the court attempted to introduce some uniformity into 
these nebulous conceptions of "egregiousness" and "waste" by stating that 
... to invoke the [business judgment] rule's protection, directors have 
a duty to inform themselves, prior to making a business decision, of 
all material information reasonably available to them. Having 
become so informed, they must then act with requisite care in the 
discharge of their duties. While the Delaware cases use a variety of 
terms to describe the applicable standard of care, our analysis satisfies us 
that under the business jud~ent rule director liability is predicated upon 
concepts of gross negligence. 36 
In summary, then it seems that the interaction between the business judgment 
rule and the standard of care, is that the existence of the rule means that a 
plaintiff seeking to challenge a board decision on the basis of a breach of the 
duty of care (rather than the duty of loyalty) will have to adduce facts which 
suggest gross negligence on the part of the directors. The gross negligence 
standard requires either that the challenged decision is, on its face, one which 
clearly could not have been reached by a rational exercise of business 
judgment, or the existence of facts which indicate that the defendant directors 
acted upon insufficient information. The leading Delaware authority on the 
need for directors to be informed before they can invoke the protections of the 
business judgment rule is the landmark decision in Smith v Van Gorkom.37 
2. Uninformed decisionmaking 
The decision in Smith v Van Gorkom that the directors of Trans Union Corp 
could be found liable for breach of the duty of care on the basis of having 
35 For example, Aronson v Lewis 473 A 2d 805 (1984) , plaintiff alleged that the certain 
terms of an employment agreement between the company and one of its directors "had 
no valid business purpose" and were "a waste of corporate assets." 
36 
37 
Aronson 812 (emphasis added). 
488 A 2d 858 (Del 1985). 
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entered into a transaction without first having obtained sufficient information, 
is worthy of discussion, if only because of the controversy it caused, and its 
statutory and commercial repercussions. For the purposes of this paper, 
however, the case is important in further elucidating the interplay between 
the business judgment rule and the notion of "gross negligence". 
The Trans Union litigation arose from a decision of the board of directors 
reached at a special board meeting held on 20 September 1980. Trans Union 
Corp had been unable to utilise its accumulated investment tax credits, and 
the market value of its shares had decreased accordingly . The board was 
involved in discussions as to how this situation might be remedied. 
Unbeknown to the rest of the board of directors, Jerome W. Van Gorkom, the 
company's chief executive officer and Chairman of the Board, had held a 
meeting with Jay Pritzker, a corporate takeover specialist, at which the 
possible acquisition of Trans Union by Pritzker had been discussed. The 
agreement they reached was that Pritzker would acquire Trans Union at a 
price of $55 per share, and additionally, would receive a lock-up option of one 
million shares at a price of $38 per share (75 cents above the existing market 
value of the shares). Pritzker required that the Trans Union board reach a 
decision on the deal within three days of his meeting with Van Gorkom. The 
day after this meeting, Van Gorkom called a special board meeting for the 
next day, without advising the directors of the purpose of the meeting. 
An hour before the scheduled board meeting, Van Gorkom advised the senior 
management team of the propsed merger agreement. The reaction of 
management was decidedly negative. At the board meeting, the chief financial 
officer told the board that the $55 offer was at the beginnng of the range of fair 
prices, but that he had only learnt of the proposal that morning, and that 
rough calculations he had prepared in relation to a possible leveraged buy-out 
transaction did not provide him with an estimate of the value of the 
corporation or a fair price for its stock. The board meeting lasted for two 
hours, and at its conclusion, the directors unanimously approved the merger 
transaction, and the document (which had been read by none of the directors, 
including Van Gorkom) was executed by Van Gorkorn that night during the 
interval at the opera. Subsequently, the merger transaction was 
overwhelmingly approved by the Trans Union shareholders. 
The Delaware Court of Chancery found that the directors were shielded from 
liability by the business judgment rule . In reversing this decision, the 
'f'JI. V' , ,nn • nv . 
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Delaware Supreme Court found that the directors had failed to inform 
themselves of all reasonably available information relevant to the decision. 
The court alluded to the the statement in Aronson, that "under the business 
judgment rule, director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross 
negligence", and said that 
We again confirm that view. We think the concept of gross 
negligence is also the proper standard for determining whether a 
business judgrnent reached by a board of directors was an informed 
one.38 
The court went on to say that the directors owed a duty to act in an informed 
and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve a merger 
agreement before submitting the proposal to the stockholders, and that in the 
merger context, a director could not abdicate that duty by leaving the decision 
to the shareholders. 
After considering the evidence as to the directors' conduct prior to the 
conclusion of the agreement, the court found that the directors did not reach 
an informed business judgment at the September 20 meeting, because (in 
summary): 
The Directors (1) did not adequately inform themselves as to Van 
Gorkorn's role in forcing the 'sale' of the Company and in 
establishing the per share purchase price; (2) were uninformed as to 
the intrinsinc value of the Company; and (3) given these 
circumstances, at a minimum, were grossly negligent in approving 
the 'sale' of the Company upon two hours consideration, without 
prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or ernergency.39 
More specifically, it was held that the directors could not invoke the statutory 
rule in Delaware General Corporation Law § 141 (e) that "directors are fully 
protected in relying in good faith on reports made by officers", as neither the 
representations made by Van Gorkom nor the tentative information supplied 
by the chief financial officer could be said to constitute "reports".4 0 
Furthermore, the fact that the $55 per share offer was significantly higher than 
the current market price of $38 was not enough, in the absence of other sound 
38 Above n 31,873. 
39 Above n 31,874. 
40 Above n 31,875. 
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valuation information, to vindicate the board's actions.41 Additionally, the 
contention of the directors that the reasonableness of their decision was 
confirmed by the fact that the acceptance of Pritzker's offer was conditional 
upon a "market test" was not accepted by the court, as it was found that the 
board was accorded no real freedom to put the company up for auction.42 Nor 
did the directors' impressive cumulative business experience and knowledge 
of the company come to their aid: the court said that this suggestion was 
undermined by their unfounded reliance on the premium and the market 
test. 43 
The court remanded for a new hearing on the determination of damages. 
Subsequent to the decision, the case was settled, and the Trans Union 
directors were liable to the extent of the difference between the real value of 
the corporation which the court arrived at, and the amount for which it was 
sold.44 
The case was instantly controversial. Some commentators saw it as a 
movement (either welcome or unwelcome) away from traditional business 
judgment rule doctrine, whilst another regarded it as fitting easily "into the 
mainstream of business judgment rule jurisprudence, with its emphasis not on 
the merits of the decision made by the directors but on the process by which 
the decision was made."45 Alternatively, Macey and Miller argue, the decision 
can be regarded as peculiarly concerned with the takeover situation, and as a 
signal to directors faced with a rush offer with a short time fuse that they 
should not be pressured into accepting such offers, and will not be found 
liable for failure to accept such an offer within tirne. 46 
Whether or not the decision in fact was supposed to alter the corporate 
director's duty of care, it was undoubtedly perceived by most as a message 
41 
42 
43 
44 
Above n 31,875. 
Above n 31, 878. 
Above n 31,880. 
This amount was $23.5 million, $10 million of which was covered by the company's 
insurance policy, and the remainder was paid almost entirely by by the Pritzker group. 
Kaye (see above, note??) 438, note 65. 
45 
(1985) 
46 
Manning "Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom" 
41 Bus Law 1, 4. 
Macey and Miller "Trans Unian Reconsidered" (1988) 98 Yale LJ 127. 
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from the Delaware Supreme court that the process of corporate 
decisionrnaking would be subject to closer judicial scrutiny than had 
previously been the case. 47 In particular, insurance premiums on D & O 
liability policies rose, and there was general agreement that directors would 
have to ensure that the information gathering process undertaken prior to 
reaching a business decision was thoroughly recorded. The court was, 
however, clearly concerned to avoid interpretation of the judgment as 
requiring that directors obtain an investment banker's opinions on every 
transaction requiring a valuation of the company, recognizing that 
[o]ften insiders familiar with the business of a going concern are in 
a better position than are outsiders to gather relevant information; 
and under appropriate circumstances, such directors may be fully 
protected in relyinJ in good faith upon the valuation reports of 
their management. 
In summary, it seems that the court in Van Gorkom was concerned to send a 
message to corporate directors that they would not be protected by the 
business judgrnent rule from the consequences of their bad decisions, where 
those decisions were not based on sufficient information. The court attempted 
to describe some guidelines as to what would constitute an acceptable level of 
information, and stated clearly that the presumption of sufficient information 
in the business judgment rule would only be overcome where the directors 
were so uninformed that they could be considered to have acted with gross 
negligence. 
As discussed above49 it was stated in Aronson that the merits of a decision of a 
board of directors will be challenged by a court only where the decision is, on 
47 Manning (see above, note 39) 2, suggests that this message might have been a 
deliberate attempt by the Delaware Supreme Court to demonstrate that the business 
judgment rule would not protect undeserving directors : he points to the competing tensions 
with which the court must deal, observing that "As the nation's high court of 
corporate jurisprudence, it works daily under klieg lights ... It must seek to foster a 
congenial environment for Delaware's leading industry - corporate home-basing. At 
the same time the court cannot, witprofessional dignity or long-term priudence, allow 
Delaware to come to be perceived as tcmrporate law equivalent of a tax-haven 
banana republic." 
48 Above n 31, 876. 
49 473 A 2d 805. See text accompanying n 30. 
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its face, so egregious or inimical to the interests of the shareholders that it can 
be labelled "gross negligence". The effect of Smith v Van Gorkom is to subject 
the decision making process to the same test. The aspect of the case which was 
regarded as unacceptable by its critics (and the dissenting judges) was not the 
court's treatment of the law, but rather, the application of the relevant 
principles to the facts. 50 McNeilly J strongly disagreed with the conclusion 
reached by the majority, commenting that "the majority opinion reads like an 
advocate's closing address to a hostile jury".51 His rebuttal of the majority's 
conclusion that the directors had been uninformed with respect to the merger 
proposal was based largely upon the directors' collective business acumen 
and familiarity with the corporation: 
These men knew Trans Union like the back of their hands and were more than qualified to make on the spot informed business judgments concerning the affairs of Trans Union, including a 100% sale of the corporation. Lest we forget, the corporate world of then and now operates on what is so aptly referred to as "the fast track".52 
He went on to argue that the directors were "acutely aware of the historical 
problems facing Trans Union which were caused by the tax laws"53 and that 
within two months of the meeting at which the merger proposal was 
accepted, the board had reviewed and discussed both an outside study of the 
corporation, and a five-year forecast prepared by management. At the 
meeting, the company's lawyer was consulted about the proposal, and as a 
result of his comments, the merger documents were amended to allow Trans 
Union to accept any better offer which might be made. In McNeilly J's 
opinion, "this record reveals that the directors acted with the utmost care in 
informing themselves of the relevant and available facts before passing on the 
merger. "54 
Additionally, it can be argued that if one aligns the concept of gross 
negligence with "egregious or irrational conduct", as the court in Aronson did, 
then criticisms of the case are perhaps justified on the ground that the 
director's conduct, whilst not a model of corporate decision making, was not 
so See McNeilly, 897. 
51 5Mith893 
52 895 
53 897 
54 897 
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egregious, nor did it betray a reckless indifference to the shareholders. 
Nevertheless, the standard dearly enunciated by the court in Van Gorkom is 
that of gross negligence 
Having reviewed the possibilities for imposing liability on directors for a 
breach of the duty of care, it can be observed that the essential effect of the 
business judgment rule is that it prevents the question of whether a director 
has acted negligently from ever being considered by a jury, provided that the 
defendant brings a pre-trial motion to dismiss proceedings for failure to state 
a cause of action, or makes an application for summary judgrnent. If a plaintiff 
seeking to bring proceedings against directors on the basis of lack of care 
cannot establish something more than ordinary negligence, the operation of 
the business judgment rule will preclude the matter from proceeding to full 
trial. If, on the other hand, at a depositions hearing it is concluded either that 
the procedures followed by a board of directors in arriving at a decision were 
so perfunctory that the directors can be said to have been grossly negligent in 
the information-gathering process (as in Van Gorkom), or that a board decision 
is so irrational or lacking in corporate purpose on its face that gross negligence 
can be assumed (as in Signal), then the negligence question will already have 
been decided. 
C The business judgment rule as a presumption 
The Delaware courts and courts applying the laws of at least twenty-one other 
US jurisdictions,55have expressed the business judgment rule as having the 
effect of a presumption that defendant directors have acted in accordance 
with their duty of loyalty to the company and that they have acted on 
sufficient information. However, it is suggested that whether or not the rule is 
considered to be a presumption will actually be immaterial to the onus of 
proof. 
In Delaware law, a presumption in a civil proceeding imposes "upon the 
party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the non-existence 
of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence".56 However, in any 
civil proceeding for negligence, the plaintiff will already bear the burden of 
proof. Therefore, the business judgment rule's presumption in favour of 
55 Block et al 13 - 14. 
56 Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence Rule 301(a). 
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directors would seem to do little more than confirm the need for the plaintiff 
to plead sufficient facts to raise a doubt that the directors' conduct fell within 
the usual scope of the business judgment rule. 
The business judgment rule provides that a court will not find a director liable 
for breach of the duty of care, unless it is established that the challenged 
decision was made on the basis of insufficient information or that it was, on its 
face, irrational or egregious. If one halts at that point, it can be oserved that in 
a pretrial motion to dismiss, the defendant's motion will be granted where the 
plaintiff has not pleaded, with particularity, facts which tend to establish 
gross negligence. If one goes on to impose a presumption that the directors 
have not been grossly negligent, that does not alter the situation. 
This argument is supported by the contention of Balotti and Hanks that "the 
term 'presumption' in the early opinions was introduced in its colloquial 
rather than its evidentiary sense and then carried forward without further 
consideration."57 They observe that the existence of the rule itself predates its 
classification as a presumption by almost a century, and that the effect of the 
rule on the burden of proof in a shareholder suit for negligence has not been 
altered following this shift in nomenclature. 
D. Situations of doubtful" disinterest" 
Despite the judicial desire not to inhibit corporate risk-taking and to shelter 
managerial discretion, courts have recognised that in certain situations there is 
a particular danger that directors might be motivated by improper 
considerations, and have been prepared to modify the operation of the 
business judgrnent rule accordingly. 
1. Defensive tactics in response to hostile takeover bids 
In the context of corporate takeovers, the Delaware Supreme Court has 
recognised 'the omnipresent spectre that a board may be acting primarily in 
its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders .. . ' 58 
57 
58 
''Rejudging the Business Judgment Rule" (1993) 48 The Bus Law 1337, 1341. 
Unocal Corporation v Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A. 2d 946 (1985). 
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The judicial response to this concern has been to impose a slightly higher 
standard for the application of the business judgment rule. Prior to 1985, 
Delaware courts would apply the rule only where directors could establish 
that their sole or primary purpose was something other than protection of 
their own positions. In 1985, the court in the Unocal case59 introduced a two-
pronged test, under which defensive actions would be shielded from judicial 
inquiry only where 
(1) the directors could show that they had reasonable grounds for 
believing that the takeover bid constituted 'a danger to corporate policy 
and effectiveness'; 
and (2) the court independently determined that the defensive action taken 
was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by the hostile offer. 
This method of 'judicial policing' of management decisions in the takeover 
context has been justified on the ground that one of the bases of the business 
judgment rule is that corporate practice is regulated to some extent by market 
forces. 60 If takeovers were able to be fended off by self-interested directors, 
with no repercussions, then the ability of the market to regulate would be 
significantly attenuated.61 
Where the business judgment rule is held to apply in these situations, the 
results can be 'startling'.62 A general criticism of the business judgment rule is 
that it tends to shelter directors from liability for idiosyncratic decisions which 
would have been unlikely to have been made by an ordinarily prudent board 
of directors. One example of such a decision in the context of takeovers is 
Paramount Communications v Time Inc. In that case, Time's directors resisted a 
takeover bid by Paramount (which involved an offer of $200 per Time share) 
and borrowed $7-10 billion to merge with another company, Warner 
Communications. The directors' decision to reject the Paramount offer was 
accorded the protection of the business judgment rule on the basis that it was 
made due to the perceived inadequacy of the offer and the Time diectors' 
concern that Time might lose its identity as a publishing company. 
59 
60 
61 
ibid. 
see above, p. 2, no.4. 
Garfield "Paramount: the mixed merits of mush" (1992) 17 Delaware Journal of 
Corporate Law 33. 
62 see note 3. 
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Undoubtedly these reasons would not have greatly impressed the Time 
shareholders whose shares traded at only $100 each after the Time-Warner 
merger. 
2. Dismissal of shareholder actions by "independent investigation committees" 
appointed by defendant directors 
The traditional rule is that the shareholders of a company have only had the 
right to sue the management of the company where it is alleged that some 
personal right of the shareholder has been infringed (for example, the 
shareholder's right to have her name entered on the share register, or the 
shareholder's right to vote at general meetings). The derivative suit was 
developed by the equity courts in order to permit the shareholder to sue to 
enforce a right of the corporation even though her own interests have not 
been directly adversely affected.63Toe derivative action 
may be viewed as a peculiar type of class action in which the 
shareholder asserts the right of the corporation for the benefit of all 
who have an interest in the corporation's success.64 
The US courts have not, however, smoothed the path of the shareholder who 
seeks to bring a derivative action. This is in part due to the notion that the 
proper person to bring an action for a wrong done to the corporation is the 
corporation itself. It is also due to a perceived high incidence of abuse of the 
derivative suit by shareholders and lawyers who instigate a derivative action 
with the objective of profiting personally rather than seeking compensation on 
behalf of the company as a whole. 
A shareholder might bring a derivative suit and, after having instituted 
proceedings, agree to settle with the corporation for a sum much smaller than 
that which was sought in the derivative action, but which would ultimately be 
of greater personal value to the litigating shareholder, as it would be paid 
directly to the shareholder, in contrast with the payment of the proceeds of a 
successful derivative action (which would be paid to the corporation itself, 
and thus would be of only indirect benefit to the individual member) . The 
63 
18How 
64 
Co., 
The derivative action was first considered by the Supreme Court in Dodge v Woolsey 
331. 
Choper, Coffee and Morris, Cases and Materials on Corporations (3ed, Little Brown and 
Boston, 1989) p.786. 
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vexatious shareholder seeking to pursue such a course is now generally 
thwarted by the imposition of a requirement that the proceeds of settlement of 
a derivative suit are now payable to the corporation, and not to the individual 
who instigates the action. However, these actions are still open to abuse by the 
attorney who instigates a derivative action in the expectation of a large fee 
upon settlement or judgment. 65 
Therefore, the derivative action is beset with procedural obstacles for the 
shareholder. The first requirement is that the shareholder must have 
exhausted all internal avenues of redress by making a demand on the Board of 
directors that they take appropriate action to remedy the alleged wrongdoing, 
or that they take the action in the name of the company. The reason for the 
courts' insistence on demand is that 
by promoting this form of alternative dispute resolution, rather 
than immediate recourse to litigation, the demand requirement is a 
recognition of the fundamental precept that directors manage the 
business and affairs of corporations.66 
Where the board of directors includes the directors against whom the 
aggrieved shareholder seeks to proceed, the general rule is that the demand 
requrernent will be excused on the ground that such a demand would be 
futile: 
where officers and directors are under an influence which sterilizes 
their discretion, they cannot be considered ;roper persons to 
conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation. 6 
The relationship between the business judgment rule and the demand 
requirement is basically that the business judgment rule will apply in 
"demand required cases", but not in cases in which demand will be excused 
65 
that 
See above ((hoper etc), p. 786. On the other hand, however, it has been pointed out 
"the derivative action and the disclosure requirements of the securities acts constitute 
the two major legal bulwarks against managerial self-dealing. The strike suit , in 
contrast , may very well be no more than an over -the -hill dragon, puffed into life to 
frighten the courts away from deciding substantive issues ... " Cary and Eisenberg 
Corporations - Cases and Materials (6ed, the Foundation Press, New York, 1988) 613. 
66 Aronson v Lewis 473 A. 2d (Del. 1984), per Moore J. 
67 Aronson v Lewis 
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on the ground of futility due to director interest. In order to avoid such 
allegations, a common practice is for boards to delegate questions of whether 
to pursue derivative actions to committees of "independent" directors, 
usually appointed after the alleged breaches. 
The issue which then arises is as to the status of the determination of a 
"special litigation committee" which, although independent in the sense that 
its members have had no part in the alleged misconduct, has been appointed 
by a board including some of the directors named as defendants. The New 
York and Delaware courts are divided on this question. 
The leading New York authority on this point is Auerbach v Bennett.68 In 
response to a request by management, the audit committee of General 
Telephone and Electronics Co. conducted an investigation into the 
corporation's international operations, and found that some of the company's 
board members had been involved in transactions which involved the 
payment from corporate funds of bribes and kickbacks to public officials and 
political parties in other countries. Upon the findings of the audit committee 
being released, Auerbach (a shareholder) instituted a shareholder's derivative 
action, alleging breaches of duty to the corporation. The board of directors 
then passed a resolution creating a special litigation committee composed of 
three disinterested directors who had joined the board shortly after the 
challenged transactions had occurred. The committee was vested with "all of 
the authority of the Board of Directors to determine, on behalf of the Board, 
the position that the Corporation shall take with respect to the derivative 
claims alleged on its behalf".69 
The committee found that no proper interest of the corporation or its 
shareholders would be served by the continued assertion of a claim against it, 
as the claims asserted were without merit, litigation costs would be 
inordinately high in view of the unlikelihood of success, the time and talents 
of senior management would be wasted on lengthy trial and pre-trial 
proceedings, and the continuing publicity could be damaging to the 
corporation's interests. The defendants brought a motion for summary 
judgment on the basis that the determination of the special litigation 
committee "insulated the first-tier transactions [that is, the alleged breaches] 
68 393 NE 2d 994. 
69 995 
VlCTORI 
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from judicial inquiry and was itself subject to the shelter of the business 
judgment doctrine".70 
The court reaffirmed the business judgment rule, and stated that 
[d]erivative claims against corporate directors belong to the 
corporation itself. As with other questions of corporate policy and 
management, the decision whether to and to what extent to explore 
and prosecute such claims lies within the judgrnent and control of 
the corporation's board of directors. Necessarily such decision must 
be predicated on the weighing and balancing of a variety of 
disparate considerations to reach a considered conclusion as to 
what course of action or inaction is best calculated to protect and 
advance the interests of the corporation. This is the essence of the 
responsibility and role of the board of directors, and courts may not 
intrude to interfere. 71 
In addressing the specific issue of whether the business judgment rule should 
apply with full force to protect the decision of the litigation committee, the 
court recognised that it could legitimately inquire as to the disinterested 
independence of the members of the committee, but rejected the submission 
of counsel for the plaintiff that any committee authorised by the board of 
which defendant directors were members must be held to be legally infirm. 
The basis for this conclusion was that the board of directors had the the 
exclusive authority on behalf of the company to direct the investigation into 
the merits of the derivative action, and to decide whether the litigation should 
be continued, and therefore 
[t]o accept the assertions of the intervenor and to disqualify the 
entire board would be to render the corporation powerless to make 
an effective business judgrnent with respect to the prosecution of 
the derivative action. 
Additionally, the court said that the board could not legitimately abdicate this 
decision to individuals wholly separate and apart from the board, as 
delegation of this kind would amount to a breach of "the non-delegable 
fiduciary duty" owed by the board to the company, its members, employees 
and creditors. 
On these grounds, the court found that the business judgment rule should 
apply to the determination of the committee and prevent judicial inquiry into 
70 996 
71 997 / / 
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the merits of the decision. This did not, however, preclude the court from 
assessing the procedures followed by the committee, as 
[p ]roof...that the investigation has been so restricted in scope, so 
shallow in execution, or otherwise so pro forma or halfhearted as to 
constitute a pretext or sham, ... would raise questions of good faith or 
conceivably fraud which would never be shielded by that doctrine. 
The court considered the process by which the committee had reached its 
decision, and judged it to be adequate, as the committee had engaged special 
counsel, interviewed all concerned individuals, and sent questionnaires to the 
corporation's nonmanagement directors. Therefore, the business judgment 
rule applied to protect the merits of the decision of the special litigation 
committee, and the motion for summary judgment was granted. 
The opposing view was taken by the Delaware Supreme Court in Zapata Corp . 
v Maldonado.72 As in Auerbach, an independent investigation committee had 
been created by the board of directors to decide what course of action the 
corporation should take in respect of the derivative suit. The conditions 
surrounding its appointment were similar to those in Auerbach: its appointor 
was the whole board of directors. One factor which might distinguish the two 
cases is that in Auerbach, the court noted that the board which appointed the 
committee was a fifteen member board, and the derivative suit was brought 
against four of the directors, whilst in Zapata, the committee was appointed by 
a board of directors of which the majority had been named as defendants. 
The court discussed the implications of recognising either the legitimacy or 
impotence of such a committee, weighing the "generally recognized 
effectiveness [of the derivative suit] as an intra-corporate means of policing 
boards of directors" against the utility of the committee mechanism as an 
effective means by which "corporations are [able] to rid themselves of 
meritless or harmful litigation and strike suits". It decided that the although 
the "self-interest taint" of the board majority was not a legal bar to the 
legitimate delegation of the board's power to a group of disinterested 
directors, the application of the business judgment rule to the determination 
of the committee was not appropriate: 
[w]e are not satisfied ... that acceptance of the "business judgment" 
rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper balancing 
72 430 A 2d 779. 
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point. While we admit an analogy with a normal case respecting 
board judgrnent, it seems to us that there is sufficient risk in the 
realities of a situation like the one presented in this case to justify 
caution beyond adherance to the theory of business judgrnent. 
Therefore, the court said, a middle course was appropriate, and the question 
of what weight to attribute to the findings of a special litigation committee 
should rest in the independent discretion of the court. The court was content 
that the factors which must be taken into consideration when deciding 
whether pursuit of the derivative action would be in the interests of he 
company "are not beyond the reach of the Court of Chancery which regularly 
and competently deals with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust 
property, approval of settlements and scores of similar problems". A two-step 
approach to this situation was prescribed. First, the corporation should have 
the burden of proving independence, good faith, and a reasonable 
investigation. If the court determines that the corporation has not satisfied this 
requirement, then it shall deny the corporation's motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment. If the court is satisfied of the independence, good faith 
and sufficient information, then it should go on to apply its own independent 
business judgment to determine whether or not the motion should be granted. 
This step requires the corporation to "carefully consider how compelling the 
corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit" 
and "should, when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law 
and public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests". 
IV DIRECTORS' 
DISCRETION IN 
A. Introduction 
DUTIES AND MANAGERIAL 
COMMONWEALTH LAW 
Perhaps the most explicit example of judicial deference to the judgment of 
company directors is contained in the judgment of Lord Wilberforce m 
Howard Smith v Ampol Petroleum Ltc[73: 
73 [1974] AC 821. This case concerned the challenge made by a shareholder to the 
validity of an allotment of shares made by the board of directors. The court held that the 
allotment was invalid, because although the company was in need of extra capital, the 
evidence suggested that the primary purpose of the allotment was to alter the nature of 
the majority shareholding. In reaching this decision, the court emphasised that it would 
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[i]t would be wrong for the court to substitute its opinion for that of 
the management, or indeed to question the correctness of the 
management's decision, if bona fide arrived at. There is no appeal 
on the merits from management decisions to courts of law, nor will 
the courts assume to act as a kind of supervisory board over 
decisions within the powers of management and honestly arrived 
at.7475 
Instances of business judgment rhetoric are apparent throughout 
commonwealth case law on the powers and duties of corporate directors, but 
there has been no consistency in terrninlogy comparable with the US courts' 
continued enunciation of the business judgment rule. This may be attributable 
to the fact that the US courts view the business judgment rule as a procedural 
safeguard against the unlimited review of complex commercial decisions by 
juries, whereas although the commonwealth courts recognise the 
undesirability of judicial review of corporate decisions, there is not the same 
immediacy to confine these matters to pre-trial proceedings. Additionally, 
there is a dearth of commonwealth authority on the director's duty of care, 
which suggests that the traditionally low standard of care applied by the 
courts has acted as an effective deterrent to prospective shareholder litigants. 
Additionally, it is difficult in some respects to make a valid comparison 
between the US application of the business judgrnent rule and the duty of 
care, and the approach of the commonwealth courts to alleged negligence on 
the part of directors. The standard by which the commonwealth director will 
be tested will depend upon the method of enforcement which is chosen by an 
aggrieved shareholder, whereas the American shareholder has only one 
avenue of redress: the derivative action. Therefore, in order to decide whether 
NZ corporate law has an implicit business judgrnent rule , it will be necessary 
to consider the burden on a plaintiff shareholder who seeks to use any of the 
available enforcement vehicles, and to compare the common law position of 
such a shareholder with the likely position under the Companies Act 1993. 
B. Oppression actions 
inquire only into the directors' 
merits of the decision to make the 
74 Above n 44, 832. 
75 
motives for this action, rather than examining the 
allotment. 
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Under section 209 of the Companies Act 1955, a shareholder could apply to 
the court where the company's affairs had been, or were being, or were likely 
to be conducted in a manner which was oppressive, unfairly discriminatory or 
unfairly prejudicial to her. In Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd76 a minority 
shareholder in a closely-held company applied to the court under s209 for an 
order requiring that the company or some of its members purchase his shares. 
The plaintiff alleged that the company's conservative policy as to the payment 
of dividends precluded him from obtaining a proper commercial return on his 
investment. The Court of Appeal accepted that the company was managed in 
a very conservative manner. The company was a family business and some of 
the other shareholders were employees. It relied on internally generated funds 
to purchase equipment and its only debts were to trade creditors. The 
dividend payments made by the company had been infrequent and modest. 
All company decisions were made by the managing director, who was the 
only director. In holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy under 
s209, Richardson J stated that "the question of fairness cannot be assessed in a 
vacuum or simply from one member's point of view ... "77 More specifically, in 
rejecting the suggestion of counsel for the plaintiff that the company could 
cover the cost of purchasing the plaintiff's shares by realising certain assets, he 
said that 
while there appears to be force in [the] submission that the 
realisation of the Martin Square yard and the fixed deposit would 
release ample funds to provide for the purchase of Malcolm 
Thomas' shares, and that to do so would not prejudice future 
trading, that necessarily involves a commercial judgment, particularly 
as to the significance of the yard and as to expectations of increases 
in its capital value in the future . ..78 
Sir Thaddeus McCarthy, concurring, added that" ... the powers given by s209 
are ones which in my view should not be lightly exercised, especially when a 
lack of 
probity or want of good faith is not established".79 
There are evident similarities between the approach of the New Zealand 
Court of Appeal in Thomas, and that of the New York court in Kamin v 
76 
77 
78 
79 
[1984] 1 NZLR 686. 
Above n 46, 694. 
Above n46, 696 (emphasis added). 
697 
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American Express Co.BO The factual similarity between the two cases arises from 
the suggestion of the respective plaintiffs that the company should have taken 
some course of action other than that chosen by the board of directors. In 
Kamin, the complainant alleged that instead of distributing the company's 
shares in another corporation to its shareholders by way of a dividend, the 
board of directors should have sold those shares on the stockmarket in order 
to take advantage of the resulting income tax savings. In Thomas, the plaintiff's 
suggestion was that the company should alter its dividend policy in order to 
provide its shareholders with a proper commercial return on their investment. 
In both cases, the court clearly stated that questions of whether and in what 
manner to pay a dividend were matters of business judgment for the board to 
decide, and that a court would not interpose its own judgment where the 
plaintiff merely alleged that the directors did not adopt the course of action 
which was most advantageous to the company. Additionally, both courts 
recognised that there were competing tensions and interests at work. In 
Thomas, these were the interests of those shareholders who were also 
employed by the company, and were concerned primarily with its long-term 
stability, set against the interests of the plaintiff who was more concerned 
with short-term profit from his investment. In Kamin, the court recognised the 
dichotomy between the tax advantages which might accrue from sale of the 
shares on the market, and the disadvantages of declaring the $25 million loss 
in the company's annual financial report. 
Both these cases could also be said to represent the traditionally non-
interventionist stance preferred by the courts in the specific context of 
directorial decisions as to payment of dividends. In Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte 
Co.,81 the plaintiff brought an action on behalf of himself and other holders of 
ordinary shares seeking a court declaration that a certain dividend paid to 
preference shareholders was paid out of capital and not profit, and an 
injunction to prevent the distribution of the funds to the shareholders. The 
basis for this allegation was that the chief asset of the company was a wasting 
asset (a mine), and that company profits should be returned to the company to 
compensate for the decrease in capital. In denying the plaintiff a remedy, the 
court articulated its reasoning in classical "busiuness judgment" terminology, 
saying that whilst it would have no problem with intervening in a case where 
the plaintiff could establish the existence of fraudulent or irnproprer motives 
80 
81 
See above Kamin 
(1889) 41 Ch D l. 
30 
... if the court sees that the directors have acted fairly and reasonably 
in ascertaining whether this is a division of profit and not of capital, 
and then in what is really a matter of internal arrangement (if it is 
done honestly and does not violate any provisions of the articles) 
the court is very unwilling to interfere, and .. . ought not to interfere, 
with the discretion exercised by the directors, who have the 
management of the company, or with the powers exercised by the 
company within the articles. 
The derivative action 
The derivative action has decreased in popularity since the advent of the 
action for oppression or conduct unfairly prejudicial, as a plaintiff seeking to 
bring a derivative action on the company's behalf must overcome a number of 
procedural barriers. The inaccessibility of the derivative action is due to the 
traditional adherence of the courts to the principle in Foss v Harbottle:82 that in 
the case of wrong done to a company, the company is the proper plaintiff. 
At common law the plaintiff seeking to assert a right of the company against 
its directors would be permitted to do so only where she could bring the 
action within the "fraud on the minority" exception to the rule in Foss v 
Harbottle. This requirement meant that a plaintiff would have to show 
(1) that the breach in respect of which the action is sought to be brought 
must be one that cannot be ratified by a simple majority of the company 
in general meeting; and 
(2) that the wrongdoers are in control of the company.83 
The meaning of the word "fraud" in this respect is not entirely clear, although 
it seems that actual dishonest intent (the traditional common law definition of 
fraud) is not necessarily required. However, there is authority to the effect 
that something more than mere negligence is required in order for the 
derivative action to proceed, as it was held in Pavlides v Jensen 84 that mere 
negligence is capable of ratification by the shareholders. In that case, a 
minority shareholder seeking to bring a derivative action alleged that the 
82 
83 
(1843) Hare 461. 
Farrar and Russell Company Law and Securities Regulation in New Zealand 
(Butterworths, Wellington, 1985) 262. 
84 (1956) 1 Ch 565. 
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directors had been grossly negligent in selling a corporate asset (an asbestos 
mine) at undervalue. In dismissing the shareholder's action, Danckwerts J 
noted that there was no allegation of fraud or ultra vires on the part of the 
defendant directors, and stated that 
[i]t was open to the company, on the resolution of a majority of the 
shareholders, to sell the mine at a price decided by the company in 
that manner, and it was open to the company by a vote of the 
majority to decide that, if the directors by their negligence or error 
of judgment had sold the company's mine at an undervalue, 
proceedings should not be taken by the company against the 
directors. 85 
Derivative actions which have been permitted to proceed usually concern 
decisions by directors which are tainted with self-interest. In Daniels v 
Daniels,86 the complaint of the plaintiff shareholder was that in 1970, the 
directors of the company (a husband and wife who were also the majority 
shareholders) had sold the company's land to one of the directors (the wife) 
for £4250, which the directors either knew or should have known to be an 
inadequate price. Subsequently, the land was resold for £120 OOO. 
Templeman J noted the decision in Pavlides, but observed that neither that 
case (which dealt solely with negligence) nor the "simple fraud" authorities 
which allowed a derivative action to proceed were applicable to the case at 
hand: 
[t]o put up with foolish directors is one thing; to put up with 
directors who are so foolish that they make a profit of £115 OOO odd 
at the expense of the company is something entirely different.87 
Once again, the familiar terms of business judgment rhetoric emerge from 
these English cases, and it seems that the commonwealth courts are conscious 
of the dangers of allowing a minority shareholder unlimited scope to 
challenge management decisions . In fact, it is arguable that the 
commonwealth courts come closest to the business judgrnent rule in these 
derivative action cases, where before the action is even permitted to proceed, 
the complaining shareholder must allege facts which amount to something 
more than mere negligence. Admittedly, the exact elements of the "fraud on 
thre minority" requirement have never been unequivocally defined, but the 
85 ibid 576. 
86 [1978] Ch D 406. 
87 ibid 414. 
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cases indicate that elements of self-interest will be enough to satisfy a court 
that a derivative action should not be thwarted. 
Under the 1993 Companies Act, the derivative action is significantly reformed, 
to completely overcome the theoretical and practical difficulties of the rule in 
Foss v Harbottle. The "fraud on the minority" requirement is abolished, and 
the procedure which a shareholder must follow is set out in section 165 which 
provides that the court may grant leave to the shareholder to bring an action 
in the name of the company. The need for a complainant to be granted leave is 
a recognition of the fact that questions of whether or not to litigate are 
generally within the domain of the board of directors. Section 165(2) lists the 
factors which the court shall have regard to when considering an application 
for leave under s165(1). These are: 
(a) The likelihood of the proceedings succeeding: 
(b) The costs of the proceedings in relation to the relief likely to be 
obtained: 
(c) Any action already taken by the company or related company to obtain 
relief: 
(d) The interests of the company or related company in the proceedings 
being commenced, continued, defended, or discontinued, as the case 
may be. 
These factors are instantly identifiable as the types of considerations taken 
into account by Special Litigation committees in the US when determining 
whether the corporation should proceed with a derivative suit instituted by a 
shareholder. This raises the question of what approach a court considering an 
application for leave should take to the decision of such a committee. 
Delegation by the board of the authority to make decisions regarding 
shareholder litigation is permitted under the 1993 Act, as such decisions are 
not within the s130(1) prohibition on the delegation of certain of the directors' 
powers (specified in the Second Schedule). The two possible approaches to 
this issue are provided by the divergent approaches of the Delaware and New 
York courts. 
As discussed above, the central issue in this respect is whether the fact that the 
alleged wrongdoers are members of the boards of directors which appoint 
such committees should have any bearing on the approach of the courts to a 
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committee's decision. In Corporate Law in Canada,88 Welling suggests that that 
Canadian courts, faced with the same dichotomy should adopt the attitude 
that the opinion of such committees should be treated in a manner similar to 
the way in which a court views the testimony of an expert witness . He 
contrasts this with the approach of the New York court in Auerbach v 
Bennett,89 which he considers to "[analogize] the 'special litigation committee' 
to an administrative tribunal",90 in refusing to inquire beyond the sufficiency 
of the procedures followed by the committee. 
It is suggested that this view is the correct one, as it recognizes the probability 
that the directors who comprise the special litigation committee may well be 
uncomfortable, albeit subconsciously, with the notion of directing that the 
company proceed against their fellow directors. 
The director's standard of care in New Zealand law 
Like the US courts, the commonwealth judiciary has recognised that exposure 
to action for ordinary negligence is more potentially damaging to the 
corporate director than to other professionals, and likely to make the office an 
unattractive one. The leading English authority on the director's duties of 
care, skill and attention is Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Limited,91 and it 
provides the benchmark for the low standard of care expected of directors. In 
that case, frauds on the part of the managing director had resulted in 
significant loss to the corporation. The other directors were clearly not 
involved in the fraud, and no breach of their duty of loyalty to the company 
was alleged, but the plaintiff (the receiver in this case) sought to establish that 
they should be held liable for the loss on the basis that they should have 
apprehended the fraud and prevented it from occurring. 
Romer J found that the directors had not breached the duty of care. He 
advanced three propositions which have come to represent the common law 
approach to the duty: 
88 
89 
90 
91 
(2ed, Butterworths, Vancouver, 1991) 533. 
393 NE 2d 994 (NYCA 1979). See above, part 
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(1) a director need show no greater degree of skill than may be 
expected from a person of his / her knowledge and experience; 
(2) a director is not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs 
of her company; 
(3) a director is entitled to rely on the advice of officers or experts. 
Additionally, stated Romer J, a director will avoid liability for conduct which 
falls short of "gross and culpable negligence". The meaning of these words is 
not elucidated in the judgment, and the question of what constitutes gross and 
culpable negligence has been debated since the case. However, unclear as it 
might be, this standard has been accepted by the Privy Council92 and the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal. 93 
A comparison between the commonwealth law "gross and culpable 
negligence" standard, and the US requirement of "gross negligence" in order 
to overcome the business judgment rule reveals that there is little distinction 
between the standard expected of directors in the two jurisdictions. 
It can be seen that there are similarities between the 'business judgment' 
approach of the American courts and the approach taken by the NZ courts 
prior to the 1993 Act. It therefore remains to be decided whether section 137 of 
the new Act has altered the duty of care or whether it leaves room for the 
similarities with the American approach. At first glance, one would assume 
that the new legislation would accord with the North American model, given 
the reference made in the Long Title to "allowing directors a wide discretion 
in matters of business judgrnent". However, the position is rendered less 
certain by the provision in section 137 that 
92 
93 
[a] director of a company, when exercising powers or performing 
duties as a director, must exercise the care, diligence and skill that a 
reasonable director would exercise in the same circumstances 
taking into account, but without lirn.itation,-
(a) The nature of the company; and 
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Kuwait Asia Bank 
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It is submitted that since the section provides no clear instruction to the courts 
to raise the standard, it is unlikely that any significant change will occur. As 
David Jones has pointed out, there is no compelling reason why the 
'reasonable director' in the 1993 Act should be held to a higher standard of 
care than the ordinary person acting on her own behalf in similar 
circumstances: 
The test is not expressed in terms of 'a reasonably careful director' , but in terms of the care of 'a reasonable director'. This could be assessed only in the light of the circumstances pertaining in any particular case because it is impossible to define the model against which the standard is to be measured ... The wording of s137 of the 1993 Act, in measuring the care expected of a director 'in the same circumstances' effectively adopts this same standard laid down by Romer J in the Re City Equitable case ... 94 
Aspects of the business judgment rule are apparent in other sections of the 
1993 Act: section 131 restates the directors duty to act in good faith and in the 
best interests of the company, and a framework for the treatment of 
transactions involving self-interest is provided in sections 109-115. However, 
there is no coherent statement of a business judgment rule of general 
application to support the view that the 1993 Act takes NZ law any closer to 
the US position than it was under Romer J's statement of the law in Re City 
Equitable. 
V CONCLUSION 
In the final analysis, it seems that the position of a director faced with a 
negligence action will be in largely the same position in both the United States 
and under the common law. Whether something more will be expected under 
the Companies Act 1993 is unclear at this stage, as the question of whether the 
words "reasonable director" import any real objectivity into the inquiry 
awaits judicial clarification. However, if the common law standard is upheld, 
then it could be said that there is an implicit version of the business judgrnent 
rule in New Zealand corporate law. The fact that the New Zealand courts 
94 Company !Aw in New Zealand: A Guide to the Companies Act 1993 (Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1993), p.121. 
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have never spoken in terms of a "presumption" in favour of directors does not 
preclude the operation of the rule in this jurisdiction, as it has been shown that 
this classification is in reality, simply a matter of semantics rather than an 
important evidentiary rule. 
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